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Generative Adversarial Networks

- GANs learn the distribution of data via a zero-sum game between:
 - Generator *G* mimicking the data distribution,
 - Discriminator *D* distinguishing *G*'s samples from real data.
- GANs are commonly formulated through a minimax problem:

$$\min_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \, \max_{D \in \mathcal{D}} \, V(G, D) = \mathbb{E} \big[\log \big(D(\mathbf{X}) \big) \big] + \mathbb{E} \big[\log \big((1 - D(G(\mathbf{Z})) \big) \big]$$

$$d(P_{\mathbf{X}}, P_{G(\mathbf{Z})})$$
: distance between $P_{\mathbf{X}}$ and $P_{G(\mathbf{Z})}$

Optimality in GAN Minimax Optimization


- What is the proper notion of optimality in GAN minimax problems?
 - Nash equilibrium (NE) of the underlying game:


$$\forall G, D: V(G^*, D) \leq V(G^*, D^*) \leq V(G, D^*)$$

- Does Nash equilibrium exist for GANs?
 - Yes under the realizability assumption: $P_{G^*(\mathbf{Z})} = P_{\mathbf{X}}$
 - G* paired with a constant D gives a NE.

Realizability in Standard GANs

- Do standard GANs produce the exact data distribution?
 - No, the minimax objective does not usually reach zero.






Realizability in Standard GANs


- Then, are the solutions found (local) Nash equilibria?
 - **Experiment**: Fix the trained *D* and keep optimizing *G*

- More empirical evidence in recent related works:
 - Berard et al., "A closer look at the Optimization Landscapes of GANs", ICLR 2020
 - Schafer et al., "Implicit competitive regularization in GANs", ICML 2020

Realizability in Standard GANs

- Then, are the solutions found (local) Nash equilibria?
 - **Experiment**: Fix the trained *D* and keep optimizing *G*





Nash Equilibrium in Non-realizable GANs

- Do Nash equilibria exist in non-realizable GAN problems?
- Theorem: Suppose $\mathbf{X} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \Sigma)$, $\sigma_{\max}(\Sigma) > 1$. Consider a regularized linear $G(\mathbf{Z}) = A\mathbf{Z} + \mathbf{b}$, $\mathbf{Z} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, I)$, $\sigma_{\max}(A) \leq 1$, $\|\mathbf{b}\|_2 \leq 1$. Then,
 - Vanilla GAN and f-GANs with **unconstrained** *D* have no NEs.
 - Wasserstein GAN with **1-Lipschitz** *D* has no NEs.
 - 2-Wasserstein GAN has no NEs with **c-concave** D and no **local** NEs with **quadratic** $D(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x}^T \Lambda \mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\gamma}^T \mathbf{x}$.


Stackelberg Equilibrium Exists in GAN games

Consider the equilibria of Stackelberg GAN game:

$$G^* \in \operatorname*{argmin}_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \big\{ \max_{D \in \mathcal{D}} V(G, D) \big\}, \quad D^*(G^*) \in \operatorname*{argmax}_{D \in \mathcal{D}} V(G^*, D) \big\}$$

- Stackelberg equilibrium will exist under mild assumptions but is in general less stable than a Nash equilibrium.
 - Stable limit points of 1, ∞-gradient descent ascent (GDA) vs. 1,1-GDA.
 - Jin et al., "What is Local Optimality in Non-convex Non-concave Minimax Optimizaion?", ICML 2020.

Stackelberg Equilibria vs. Nash Equilibria



Proximal Equilibria: Spectrum between Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria


• For ||D||, λ , we define the proximal objective:

$$V_{\lambda}^{\mathrm{prox}}(G,D) := \max_{\widetilde{D} \in \mathcal{D}} V(G,\widetilde{D}) - \lambda \|D - \widetilde{D}\|^2.$$

- We define $V_{\lambda}^{\mathrm{prox}}(G,D)$'s Nash equilibria as λ -proximal equilibria.
- Nested property of proximal equilibria:

$$\lambda_1 \leq \lambda_2 \Rightarrow \operatorname{PE}(\lambda_2) \subseteq \operatorname{PE}(\lambda_1)$$

Proximal Equilibria: Spectrum between Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria



Question: Does a λ -proximal equilibrium exist for λ >0?

Proximal Equilibria in Wasserstein GANs

• **Theorem:** Consider the W2GAN problem minimizing the following optimal transport cost:

$$W_2(P_{\mathbf{X}}, P_{G(\mathbf{Z})}) := \min_{\Pi(P_{\mathbf{X}}, P_{G(\mathbf{Z})})} \mathbb{E}\left[\beta \|\mathbf{X} - \mathbf{X}'\|_2^2\right]$$

Then, the W2GAN problem has a $1/\beta$ -proximal equilibrium w.r.t.

$$||D||_{\text{Sobolev}} = \sqrt{\mathbb{E}_{P_{\mathbf{X}}} \left[\left\| \nabla D(\mathbf{X}) \right\|_{2}^{2} \right]}$$

• We also prove a similar result for standard WGANs.

Proximal Equilibria in Wasserstein GANs: Proof

• Brenier's theorem from optimal transport theory implies for optimal D_G

$$W_2(P_{\mathbf{X}}, P_{G(\mathbf{Z})}) = \frac{1}{\beta} \mathbb{E}_{P_{\mathbf{X}}} \left[\left\| \nabla D_G(\mathbf{X}) \right\|_2^2 \right]$$

• We reformulate the W2GAN problem as


$$\min_{G \in \mathcal{G}} W_2 \left(P_{\mathbf{X}}, P_{G(\mathbf{Z})} \right) \equiv \min_{D_G \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{G}}} \frac{1}{\beta} \mathbb{E}_{P_{\mathbf{X}}} \left[\left\| \nabla D_G(\mathbf{X}) \right\|_2^2 \right]$$
Strongly-convex w.r.t. the Sobolev norm

• Minimizing a strongly-convex function over a convex set implies

$$V_{1/\beta}^{\text{prox}}(G^*, D_{G^*}) = W_2(P_{\mathbf{X}}, P_{G^*(\mathbf{Z})}) \leq W_2(P_{\mathbf{X}}, P_{G(\mathbf{Z})}) - \frac{1}{\beta} \|D_G - D_{G^*}\|_{\text{Sobolev}}^2 \leq V_{1/\beta}^{\text{prox}}(G, D_{G^*})$$

Proximal Equilibrium in Standard GANs

- Are the solutions found (local) proximal equilibria?
 - **Experiment:** Fix the final trained D and optimize $V_{\lambda}^{\text{prox}}(G, D)$




Proximal Training via Optimizing the Proximal Objective

• **Observation:** λ -Proximal equilibria are stable limit points of every alternating gradient method in solving:

$$\min_{G \in \mathcal{G}} \max_{D \in \mathcal{D}} V_{\lambda}^{\text{prox}}(G, D)$$

• Proximal training: Apply alternating gradient methods to optimize $V_{\lambda}^{\text{prox}}(G,D)$ instead of the original V(G,D).

Proximal Training vs. Regular Training




SN-GAN: Regular Training



SN-GAN: Proximal Training

Proximal Training vs. Regular Training



SN-GAN: Regular Training

Inception score: 5.62 ± 0.23



SN-GAN: Proximal Training

Inception score: 6.12 ± 0.22

Thank you for your attention!

arXiv link: arxiv.org/abs/2002.09124